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Abstract This paper investigates the world-wide economic cost of rapid sea-level rise of
the kind that could be caused by accelerated ice flow from the West Antarctic and/or the
Greenland ice sheets. Such an event would have direct impacts on economic activities located
near the coastline and indirect impacts further inland. Using data from the DIVA model on
sea floods, river floods, land loss, salinisation and forced migration, we analyse the effects
of these damages in a computable general equilibrium model for 25 world regions. We
consider three sea-level rise scenarios that correspond to 0.47, 1.12 and 1.75m by the 2080s.
By incorporating a wider range of damage categories, implemented in an economy-wide
framework and including very rapid sea-level rise, the study offers a new contribution to
climate change impact studies. We find that the loss of GDP worldwide is 0.5% in the
highest sea-level rise scenario, with a loss of welfare (equivalent variation) of almost 2%
world-wide. Within these aggregates, there are large regional disparities, with the Central
Europe North region and parts of South-East Asia and South Asia being especially prone
to high costs (welfare losses in the range of 4–12%). The analysis assumes that there is
not public adaptation, which would substantially lower the costs. In this way, the analysis
demonstrates what is at risk, and could be used to justify adaptation expenses.
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1 Introduction
Coastal regions provide important services and functions for the economy. Many major
settlements have developed in low-lying coastal zones, often driven by the importance of
water transport. The prospect of a changing sea level has significant direct implications for
most countries and many major cities around the world (Nicholls et al. 2007), and is often
cited as one of the reasons for concern about climate change (Smith et al. 2009).
Moreover, the coastal impact category is one of the most important ones in comparative
terms. For instance, Ciscar et al. (2014) consider eight different impact categories (including
e.g. agriculture, energy, tourism and forest fires) in an assessment of climate impacts in
Europe, without public adaptation. They found coastal damages to be the most important
impact category among the market impacts.
An indication of the scale of the people and economic activity potentially impacted by
sea-level rise (SLR) is suggested in Dasgupta et al. (2009) who use satellite data of land usage
to calculate the percentage of GDP and population that would be impacted by multi-metre
SLR in 84 developing countries. In these countries it is estimated that roughly 2% of GDP
and population are within the inundation zone for a 2-m SLR.
Other studies identify significant potential impacts at regional and local scales. For
instance, Heberger et al. (2011) analyse key categories of infrastructure located in coastal
zones in California. They note that if sea-level rose by 1.4m, 56 schools, 13 healthcare
facilities and 330 sites containing hazardous materials would be at risk from a 100-year
flood event. They also identify 28 wastewater treatment plants and 30 coastal power plants
that would be at risk under such circumstances. Other studies identifying micro-scale
impacts include Delta Committee (2008) and Koningsveld et al. (2008), for the Nether-
lands, Breil et al. (2005), for the city of Venice, Saizar (1997), for Montevideo, Morisugi et
al. (1995), for Ise Bay in Japan and Smith and Lazo (2001) who summarise country-level
and sub-country-level studies from all continents. Losada et al. (2013), which investigates
the impact of rising sea levels around the Latin American and Caribbean coast, emphasises
the importance of considering changes in storm surges and extreme coastal events.1
There is considerable uncertainty over the amount of SLR that should be expected as a
result of climate change. Estimates for this century range froma fewdecimetres tomulti-metre
rises, depending crucially on the response of large ice sheets to a warming climate. Nicholls
et al. (2008) investigate the global impact were extreme SLR to occur. Specifically, the paper
considers the collapse of theWestAntarctic Ice Sheet, which is assumed to cause an additional
5m of SLR. The earliest year considered for complete collapse is 2130 (representing very
fast collapse), and later dates are also considered. This work utilises the DIVA model, and
considers the impacts from land loss, wetland loss, protection costs and forced migration.
The model allows for coastal land to either be defended (if the benefits of doing so outweigh
the costs) or abandoned (if not). Different types of impacts are estimated, including, for the
most extreme scenario, the cost of coastal protection, which would rise to around $30 billion
per year by the end of the century, and the number of people forced to migrate, which would
peak at around 350,000 people per year in the 2040s.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE)models can be used to assess the overall economic
implications of SLR, on top of the direct economic impacts. An early CGE study looking
into the economy-wide impacts of SLR is Darwin and Tol (2001). The paper utilises the
Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM), which contains an eight-region CGE model,
1 The DIVA model used in this study does take account of storm surges and extreme weather events (see
Sect. 3).
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to investigate the economic implications of a 0.5m SLR. The economic loss is modelled as
a loss of production capital. The article demonstrates clearly the importance of changes in
consumer prices caused by SLR impacts, as well as the importance of international trade,
both of which are captured within a CGE framework, but not with direct cost estimates.
Deke et al. (2001) also use a global CGE model and assume that all threatened coastal
zones are protected, so that the shock is the cost of protection, which is subtracted from
investment elsewhere in the economy. The welfare losses across the eleven world regions
considered range from −0.006% in Western Europe to −0.309% in both India and Pacific
Asia. The main reason for the relatively low welfare losses is that the SLR projections are at
the low end of the IPCC range (13–14cm by 2100).
Bosello et al. (2007) employ the GTAP-EF CGE model,2 which divides the world into
eight regions, assuming 25cmSLRby 2050. They emphasise the need for general equilibrium
effects to be considered, arguing that estimates using direct costs alone can be significantly
biased, typically underestimating the costs. Bosello et al. (2012) use the same model to
make a more detailed assessment for EU countries using direct costs from the DIVA model
as an input. It is interesting to note that only land losses and adaptation costs are used
when entering shocks into the CGE model, with land losses being used to shock productive
agriculture. The other components of SLR damages, mainly sea floods and migration costs
are not integrated.3 Indeed, the authors note that this approach “neglects potential effects
on infrastructure, physical capital or on labour productivity caused for instance by forced
displacement” (p. 74).
SLR could also influence economic growth, which is addressed in Hallegatte (2012), who
inter alia considers a reduction in usable capital. Though the impact of temporary flooding
on growth is found to be more ambiguous (whether damage from a natural disaster leads
to a lower or higher growth path appears to be dependent on the region and the disaster in
question), someof the damagewould result in a permanent capital loss. Thiswouldmost likely
reduce long-term growth rates, and supports the notion that at least some of the economic
loss can be modelled by a reduction in capital stock.
Themain purpose of this article is to explore in detail the economic implications of extreme
SLR scenarios, without public adaptation, under a CGE modelling setup. In particular, our
paper explores two aspects not considered so far by the literature. First, we analyse the general
equilibriumeffects of SLR impacts for very high SLR scenarios. Three specific SLR scenarios
are modelled with the DIVA model. The first one concerns a moderate SLR profile and the
other two much higher SLR profiles (of 1.4 and 2m by 2100), associated with significant ice
sheet loss.
Second, this study integrates a wider range of SLR damage categories into a CGE model,
deriving therefore more comprehensive estimates of economic impacts. This is in contrast
to studies that have focused only on land losses, which represent a small share of the total
economic damages due to SLR. In this paper we explicitly model the other key impacts,
mainly the economic damages associated with forced migration and sea floods.
The damage estimates used in this paper are those without public adaptation. In cases
where the damages exceed the cost of adaptation—through public sector interventions such
as sea dykes and beach nourishment—countries or regions would rationally be expected
to take measures to protect their coastlines. Allowing for public adaptation would reduce
2 The GTAP-EF model is a development of the GTAP-E model (Burniaux and Truong 2002), itself a devel-
opment of the GTAP model (Hertel 1997).
3 Though they report direct damages from sea floods, salinisation and forced migration, these are only used in
the CGE section of the paper to the extent that they are determinants of the amount of adaptation expenditure
that is considered worthwhile.
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the damage estimates (or at least not increase them since only cost effective protection is
permitted), perhaps considerably in some cases (see for example, Fankhauser 1995; Bosello
et al. 2012). The estimates calculated in this paper highlight the potential damage costs that
could be used to justify investment in coastal protection. Moreover, thanks to the use of the
CGEmethodology, private level adaptation is also considered in the analysis as all the market
adjustments happening via price changes are considered in the assessment (see e.g. Aaheim
et al. 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains and justifies the selected SLR scenarios.
The economic estimates of the SLRdirect costs from theDIVAmodel are explained in Sect. 3.
Section 4 first outlines themain features of the CAGE computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model, and the implementation of the SLR shocks into the CGE model. Section 5 reports the
results and Sect. 6 concludes. The “Appendix” details the mathematical model statement for
the CAGE model.
2 Selected Sea-Level Rise Scenarios
This section reviews the literature on SLR, which has been used as a guide for the SLR
scenarios chosen for this paper. The amount of SLR that can be expected for this century has
twomain sources of uncertainty: the extent of the temperature rise (which itself depends partly
on the actions of human society; IPCC 2007), and the response of sea level to temperature,
influenced in particular by the response of ice sheets. Estimates can be made based on studies
of the current ice sheet structure and behaviour, as well as analysing the geological records.
One particular difficulty of this is that the potential speed of temperature change (which
can be considered geologically instantaneous) is unprecedented. Therefore whilst research
using the geological record has provided considerable evidence, the current situation has no
close analogue from the past. Whilst one expects that estimates of ice sheet response will
continue to improve, precise quantification has proved challenging due to “insufficient data
and a limited ability to model the underlying process” (Kriegler et al. 2009).
According to the Fourth Assessment Report from the IPCC, the range for potential SLR is
between 18 and59cmby the last decade of the twenty-first century, depending on the emission
scenario (Meehl et al. 2007). This fairly modest prediction camewith a vital qualification: the
figure excludes the possibility of “future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow”. Nevertheless,
the report does discuss the threat of ice-sheet melting/collapse, with the Greenland and the
WestAntarctic IceSheets (GIS andWAIS) being considered as relatively vulnerable. Together
these ice sheets hold enoughH2O to cause SLRof around 12m (Meehl et al. 2007).4 Although
the IPCC authors were well-aware of these possibilities, they felt unable to place numerical
values on the probabilities due to limitations of the available research at the time.
A key question to understand the pace of SLR is how quickly the process accelerates.
Hansen (2007) describes it this way: “Ice sheet disintegration, unlike ice sheet growth, is
a wet process that can proceed rapidly. Multiple positive feedbacks accelerate the process
once it is underway”.5 To emphasise the importance of acceleration, the paper muses that
if SLR doubles every decade, then a 1 cm SLR from 2005 to 2015 grows to a cumulative
4 If both the Greenland Ice Sheet and the whole of the Antarctic Ice Sheet were to melt, they “hold enough ice
to raise sea level by about 64 metres” (Bentley et al. 2007:101), however the bulk of the Antarctic Ice Sheet
is not considered vulnerable to collapse.
5 Rapid melting has occurred in the past, such as the rapid deglaciation 14,600 years ago known as meltwater
pulse 1A, which saw a 20-m rise in less than 500 years (Weaver et al. 2003). Though clearly, the ice sheets
prior to this event were considerably larger than those that exist today.
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total of 5 m SLR by 2100. Though the numbers in this example are expositional, rather than
predictive, the concept is important: ice-sheet melting, and hence sea-level rise, may well be
an accelerating process, rather than a linear process.
Subsequent research is suggestive of the increasing contributions to SLR fromaccelerating
ice flow. Velicogna (2009) uses data from the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment
(GRACE) satellite gravity mission to show that the rate of ice loss is increasing from both
the GIS and WAIS. The Copenhagen Diagnosis (2009) reports that satellites show global
average sea-level rise to be 80% above the IPCC’s (2007) predictions (3.4 mm/year over the
past 15 years). This acceleration in SLR is consistent with a doubling in contribution from
melting of glaciers, ice caps and the GIS and WAIS. This scenario is broadly corroborated
by Grinsted et al. (2010). These studies suggest that currently observed melting rates lead
one to expect some increasing contribution to SLR from melting ice sheets.
The Rahmstorf (2007) study is based upon a ’semi-empirical’ relationship between global
mean surface temperature and sea level. Applying this relationship to the warming scenarios
put forward by the IPCC 4AR the projected SLR is between 0.5 and 1.4m. The high end of
this range is used for one of the scenarios in this article.
Lowe and Gregory (2010) note the likelihood that the contributions to SLR from the ice
sheets is probably substantially more than what occurred in the previous century, noting that
such a change would be necessary for SLR to exceed a metre in the twenty-first century.
They argue that increases of as much as 2m are possible, though this is qualified by noting
that such a rise is “not … inevitable or even likely”. As a 2-m rise is considered a possibility,
this research uses it for its highest SLR scenario.
It is worth noting that a number of studies suggest that SLR beyond two metres is ulti-
mately possible, or even likely, with global warming, driven by partial or complete collapse
or melting of the GIS and WAIS (see Kopp et al. 2009; Lenton et al. 2008; Kriegler et al.
2009). However these studies focus on long-term changes and do not specifically address the
SLR during this century.
For this research, the three selected scenarios runs are named (i) A1B, (ii) Rahm and
(iii) High scenario. The A1B scenario is consistent with the A1B IMAGE scenario, which
assumes a warming of 2.4 ◦C by the 2050s and 3.8 ◦C by the 2090s.6 The two rapid SLR
scenarios use the upper end of the ranges proposed in the two papers noted in the previous
discussion. In the Rahm scenario (Rahmstorf 2007), sea level rises by 1.4m by 2100, and in
the High scenario (Lowe and Gregory 2010) by 2m by 2100. Such very high SLR scenarios
represent an expansion of the literature as is outlined in Sect. 1.
In many climate impact assessments the damage estimates are computed for the average
of thirty years as a way to consider a representative period of time for the climatic conditions.
Thus in this study the reference period is the 2080s (meaning the average over the 2071-2100
period). The corresponding average rises in global sea level (for the year 2085) relative to pre-
industrial levels are 0.47, 1.12 and 1.75m in the A1B, Rahm andHigh scenarios, respectively.
3 Data for the Direct Costs of Sea-Level Rise
The SLR direct costs come from the DIVAmodel (DINAS-Coast Consortium 2006; McFad-
den et al. 2007; Vafeidis et al. 2008)7 and the DIVA socio-economic scenarios (Tol 2006).
6 The DIVA model uses the A1B (IMAGE) scenario in place of the traditional IPCC A1B scenario as it
provides a pattern of SLR (DIVA model notes).
7 See also http://www.diva-model.net.
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The DIVAmodel assesses the biophysical and socio-economic consequences, such as coastal
flooding (including river flooding), land loss, damage from salinity and forcedmigration. The
DIVA model itself uses data for SLR provided by the UK Met Office Hadley Centre and the
multi-model climate experiment from the European Commission ENSEMBLES project.
The model is well established, having been widely used for peer-reviewed publications
(including for earlier estimates of SLR damages for Europe such as Bosello et al. (2012)
and Ciscar et al. (2012), using the GEM-E3 model, Capros et al. (2013)).
The scenarios in this paper are named after the average global sea-level rise. Yet the DIVA
model considers the regional variations of SLR (indeed SLR varies by section of coastline in
the model). It takes into account the effects of erosion, inundation and salinisation for each
SLR profile and computes the corresponding damage estimates for land loss (erosion and
inundation), forcedmigration (erosion and inundation), expected coastal and river flood dam-
age (inundation) and salinisation costs (salinisation). The DIVA calculation of the damage
estimates is as follows (seeTol 2006, for details). Firstly, sea-flooddamage estimates are based
on expected damages from flooding that are expected once per year, once per 10 years, once
per 100 years and once per 1,000 years, with each category having progressively higher dam-
ages. The damage is dependent on a “maximumpossible damage”, the income density and the
height of the flood. For river-flood damage estimates, the procedure is similar to that for sea
floods. This category becomesmore important for rivers with large coastal flood plains. Salin-
isation damage estimates are based on the potential loss of value of salinated agricultural land
(salt-tolerant crops are considered unlikely to be good substitutes for currently popular crops).
The final category of damage is the number of forced migrants due to SLR. That number
is defined as the coastal area permanently flooded multiplied by the population density.
Given that the year-to-year variability of the number of forced migrants is very high, the
average annual value for the 2071-2100 period has been allocated to the 2080s. The economic
valuation of the damage due to forced migration (which can be interpreted as the willingness
to pay to not migrate) is assumed to be three times GDP per capita, following Tol (2006).8
The consequent direct damage shocks are provided in Table 1. The total global damage
under the A1B scenario is estimated to be $253 billion, which can more than double, to $550
billion, under the High scenario. Most of the damage is associated with sea floods, river
floods, salinization and land loss. It should be noted that sea floods costs represent the bulk
of the impacts within that category. Interestingly, when higher sea level rise scenarios are
considered the share of the migration costs in the total damage rises (from 5% in the A1B
scenario to 12% in the High scenario).
Regarding the regional pattern of damages, Asia experiences most of the damages, mainly
inChina, Rest of South-eastAsia, India,Korea and Japan. InEurope damages aremuch higher
in the Central Europe (North) region, compared to other European regions. Damages in the
USA are also large, especially migration costs, and overall are similar to those of the Central
Europe (North) region.
4 Modelling Methodology for Economy-Wide Impacts
This section reviews the main features of the CAGE model (the CGE model employed in
this study) and explains how the direct cost estimates described in the previous section are
integrated into the model.
8 It is assumed that people permanently migrate to a new location, with relatively high associated migration
costs (the cost per migrant is assumed to be three times the per capita income, as already noted). Consequently,
possible productivity losses associated to temporary migration are not considered.
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Table 1 Total 2080s direct damage shock from sea floods, river floods, salinisation and land loss (summed














China 64.2 95.8 118.4 5.7 4.5 4.5
Japan 4.8 11.3 15.2 0.0 6.9 4.6
Korea 11.5 20.4 23.6 0.0 3.8 1.0
Indonesia 3.2 6.8 9.8 0.1 0.6 0.5
Russia 1.6 2.3 2.8 0.4 0.3 0.2
India 24.2 30.5 36.0 0.7 0.5 0.6
USA 10.3 18.4 25.2 0.4 17.2 17.2
Canada 6.2 7.3 8.2 0.2 1.7 0.3
Mexico 0.5 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.3
Brazil 0.9 2.3 3.8 0.0 0.6 0.6
South Africa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK & Ireland 4.0 7.0 9.1 0.3 9.1 8.2
Northern
Europe








4.1 6.5 7.9 0.1 5.2 1.9
Southern
Europe
1.5 3.0 4.5 0.3 3.3 3.0
Australasia 0.5 1.2 1.8 0.1 1.1 0.8
Rest of South
Asia




1.5 2.3 3.3 0.1 0.1 0.2




41.8 82.0 101.5 1.2 6.6 2.4
Rest of Former
USSR
0.6 0.9 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
Middle East &
North Africa




0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
Rest of South
America
20.3 24.2 28.2 0.1 0.4 0.3
WORLD 242 385 486 11 75 64
Source: DIVA model output (summations across regions and damage categories are authors’ calculations, as
are the translation of the number of migrants into dollar values)
a Explanatory note: Whilst cumulative migration in high SLR scenarios is always higher, this research takes
the average values for 2070s, 2080s and 2090s. In some high SLR cases, e.g. China, much migration has
already occurred in earlier decades, so the additional migration in these three decades is lower in the high
SLR scenarios than the A1B scenario
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4.1 The Climate Assessment General Equilibrium (CAGE) Model
The Climate Assessment General Equilibrium (CAGE) model is a static, multi-region, multi-
sectorworldCGEmodel based on theGlobalTradeAnalysis Project (GTAP) database version
8 (Narayanan et al. 2012) as its primary data source. As explained further in this section, the
model follows standard CGE practice. The full model description and mathematical model
statement is provided in the “Appendix”.
The CGE analysis follows a static comparative approach (as in e.g. Aaheim et al. 2012;
Ciscar et al. 2012), estimating the counterfactual of future SLR (simulated in the 2080s)
occurring under the current socioeconomic conditions. Therefore, the SLR future scenarios
are shocking the current economy (base year of the model, 2007), without considering that
there will be economic growth and demographic change from now to the end of the century.
As a consequence, the estimated economic impacts represent a level shift or one-off change
in welfare or GDP, and not a change in the growth rates. However, since SLR damage and
capital growth are both expected to occur incrementally between 2007 and the 2080s, special
consideration is given to the correct calculation of the shock to capital stock (see explanation
below).
The GTAP database provides input-output tables for 129 countries/regions (covering all
countries) and 57 commodity categories. For this analysis, production has been aggregated
to 19 sectors.9 The choice of regional aggregation (25 regions) was decided according to the
following criteria. Firstly, themajor individual countries in the climate negotiations have been
included separately; therefore Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,Mexico,
Russia, South Africa and the USA are included individually. The European Union has been
split into five regions: UK and Ireland, Northern Europe, Central Europe (North), Central
Europe (South) andSouthernEurope.10 The remaining regions have been split geographically
and are Australasia, Rest of South Asia, Rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Rest of Europe, Rest of
South-East Asia, Rest of Former Soviet Union,Middle East &North Africa, Central America
& Caribbean and South America. All regions are linked through endogenous bilateral trade.
Regarding the closure roles of the CGE model, it is assumed that labour and capital can
move between sectors within a country, but they are immobile across regions (see “Appendix”
for more details).
4.2 Modelling the Impacts of SLR in a CGE Framework
The twomain categories of damages (Table 1) have been interpreted as three kinds of damage
shocks: damage from forced migration, damage to current consumption (other than from
migration) and damage to the capital stock. The forced migration damage is interpreted in
the CAGE model as an increase in obliged consumption, which means that the expenditure
associatedwith forcedmigration is included as part ofGDP, but not part ofwelfare (equivalent
9 The sectors are coal, gas, petroleum, crude oil, electricity, construction, chemicals, agriculture, crops, for-
est, metals, other energy intensive industries, electronic equipment, transport equipment, other equipment,
consumer goods, transport, market services and non-market services.
10 The same disaggregation was used for the PESETA project (Ciscar et al. 2011). Precisely, the categories
are:
UK and Ireland: United Kingdom and Ireland
Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden
Central Europe (North): Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland
Central Europe (South): Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
Southern Europe: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain.
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variation).11 Therefore, the obliged consumption implies a welfare loss, as consumption is
allocated to (compulsory)migration instead of other purposes. In order to estimate the number
of migrants in one year in the 2080s, the average value is taken for the 2070s, 2080s and
2090s. This smoothes the variation noted in some regions across these decades. (See also
explanatory note to Table 1.)
The remaining sources of damage costs are sea floods, river floods, land loss and salin-
isation, of which the largest is sea floods in all regions except Canada. We use the damage
estimates for the 2080s. Such damages are interpreted as partially impacting current expen-
diture, which is modelled as change in obliged consumption (similar to the migration shock),
and partially impacting the capital stock (see below for methodology). Evidence on how to
split the damages between the two impact types can be found in studies such as Floodsite
(2006), which inter alia cites a study about floods in Saxony, where the majority of eco-
nomic damage from flooding is to buildings and infrastructure (i.e. capital stock), rather than
to household goods, crops or livestock (note however, emergency costs are not reported).
Some damage to buildings and infrastructure will be repaired (a current expenditure) and
others will either reduce the capital stock or redirect capital investment which would have
been produced elsewhere (also leading to a net reduction in capital).
As the appropriate share of damages that affects capital is uncertain, we choose a central
scenario of 30% for capital loss, and then perform sensitivity analysis for a lower (15%) and
higher share of capital (45%). For our central case then, 70% of the value of these damages
is accounted for as an increase in obliged consumption, which is included in GDP, but not in
welfare.
An important issue arises here regarding how to compute the impact on capital stock.DIVA
estimates the damages for each year from now until 2100. Given the capital endowment of an
economy is a stock variable, we have computed the cumulative damage to capital stock that
would occur by the 2080s. As a consequence, to calculate the cumulative damage from the
reduction in capital stock (computed as the percentage reduction in capital stock projected
for the year 2085), we take the annual share of the damage to the capital stock, depreciated
over time (at 5% annually).
It should be noted that the assumption on the projected growth of capital stock plays a
major role in the overall damage estimate. The projected growth path for regional capital
stock (in the absence of SLR) is taken from the MaGE macroeconometric model projections
(Fouré et al. 2012), which has estimates until 2050. These estimates have been extended
until 2085 using the exponential growth path for 2021–2050, and then the average annual
growth rate between 2007 (the base year of the model) and 2085 can be readily calculated.





(1 − δ)2085−t × Dr,t
))
(
K0r × (1 + gkr )78
)
where KL: percent loss of capital stock; α: share of damage to capital δ: depreciation rate;
D: damage cost; K0: base year capital stock; gk: growth rate of capital stock in absence of
SLR; the sets are r for region and t for year.
The denominator computes the projected capital stock if there was no SLR. Note that
capital stock growth is compounded over 78 years, which covers the period from the base
year of the model, 2007, until 2085.
11 One could consider that forced un-planned migration could result in production losses with labour being
temporarily unemployed or underemployed. However, if future migrants are given warning of the need to
move, and so can plan new employment and so on, then production losses would not be expected to be large.
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The resulting capital losses are reported below in Table 2. As can be seen, the majority of
regions face losses of capital of < 1%, even in the High SLR scenario only 5 regions out of
25 are exceptions. The numerator calculates the cumulative capital loss, which is the result
of the aggregation of the flow of the depreciated damage costs (in excess of the damage cost
of no SLR12) times the share of damage to the capital stock.
5 Results
This section presents the two main sets of results regarding GDP and welfare changes. It also
presents a sensitivity analysis exercise to one of the parameters used in the implementation
of the SLR shock into the CAGE model.
GDP measures the impact of SLR on economic production; however it does not capture
the full consequences for household welfare. Therefore we also report the impact on welfare
(equivalent variation) for households.Recall thatwhile direct expenditure on forcedmigration
and repairs are recorded as part of GDP, it reduces welfare since the spending is compulsory.
Therefore, GDP changes are mainly driven by the shock to the capital stock, while equivalent
variation changes are more closely related to the current consumption shocks.
5.1 Main Scenarios
The results for the three main scenarios are presented in terms of GDP losses (Table 3) and
equivalent variation (Table 4).
The global GDP losses rise from 0.15% under the A1B scenario to 0.50% under the
High scenario, with large regional disparities. Under the A1B scenario, the region with the
largest GDP loss is Central Europe (North) with 0.61% (which could be expected, as it is
the region with the highest percentage capital loss, Table 2), followed by Rest of South-East
Asia with 0.37%. Most regions experience fairly small percentage shocks for this scenario,
though one notes that the absolute values of the shocks are often substantial. As anticipated,
all regions experience higher GDP losses for higher SLR scenarios. In the Rahm scenario,
which considers sea levels rising towards 1.4m by the end of the century, the two most
affected regions (again Rest of South-East Asia and Central Europe North) experience GDP
losses above 1%.
One can also identify a second tier of affected regions that experience losses around 0.5–
0.6% of GDP, namely Japan, Korea and Northern Europe. The same pattern of most-affected
regions continues in the High scenario with the values rising further, up to a maximum of
1.72% of GDP in Central Europe North. At the other end of the scale, one can note those
regions left nearly unaffected by SLR. Even in the High scenario, Mexico, South Africa and
Rest of Former Soviet Union show less than 0.02% GDP losses, and Russia, sub-Saharan
Africa and Central America & Caribbean show less than 0.07% GDP losses.
The percentage loss of equivalent variation is shown in Table 4 and also graphically for
the High scenario in Fig. 1. The percentage loss is higher than GDP alone (which does not
distinguish between obliged and non-obliged consumption), with world losses of 0.54% for
the A1B scenario, rising to 1.91% for the High scenario. The regional composition of the
damages is also altered. Regarding the A1B scenario, Rest of South-East Asia now shows
the largest losses, but particularly noteworthy is that China shows the second largest losses
at 2.18% of equivalent variation, and South Asia also shows high losses at 0.98% (the 5th
12 DIVA also calculates costs arising from no change in SLR, as there would still be, for example, storm
damage. The costs here are only those above this level.
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Table 2 Percentage capital losses entered into the CAGEmodel (median SLR by 2085 of scenario in brackets)
Region A1B (0.47m) RAHM (1.12m) High (1.75m)
China 0.08 0.18 0.27
Japan 0.49 1.21 1.73
Korea 0.42 1.08 1.42
Indonesia 0.12 0.47 0.82
Russia 0.04 0.06 0.09
India 0.05 0.12 0.18
USA 0.28 0.57 0.90
Canada 0.17 0.36 0.55
Mexico 0.01 0.04 0.07
Brazil 0.03 0.13 0.25
South Africa 0.01 0.02 0.03
UK & Ireland 0.31 0.62 0.95
Northern Europe 0.34 1.09 1.86
Central Europe (North) 1.26 2.12 3.41
Central Europe (South) 0.23 0.47 0.69
Southern Europe 0.18 0.36 0.60
Australasia 0.07 0.17 0.28
Rest of South Asia 0.13 0.39 0.71
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.01 0.03 0.05
Rest of Europe 0.20 0.31 0.43
Rest of South-east Asia 0.56 1.69 2.43
Rest of Former USSR 0.02 0.05 0.08
Middle East & North Africa 0.06 0.14 0.23
Central America & Caribbean 0.01 0.04 0.07
Rest of South America 0.18 0.48 0.84
hardest hit region). These two regions experience high damages from current expenditure and
migration, though the percentage capital loss is relatively small, hence the fact that neither
were among the regions with the largest GDP losses. The regional pattern of damages is
approximately maintained into the high SLR scenarios. In the High scenario, Rest of South-
East Asia shows a huge 12.91% loss, followed by China (5.63%) and South Asia (5.20%).
The less affected regions are South Africa, Mexico and Russia, who experience equivalent
variation losses in a range between 0.1 and 0.3%. The values for the High scenario are
mapped in Fig. 1, which more clearly shows the geographical distribution of the impacts.
Note that the impacts are calculated as a share of equivalent variation at the level of the 25
regions (not individual countries).13
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 5 and 6 report the GDP and welfare changes, respectively, for the sensitivity analysis
regarding the share of the sea floods damage that affects capital stock. While in the standard
13 For example, inland countries such as Austria, Mongolia and Paraguay are not directly affected by sea-level
rise. For them, the damages shown in Fig. 1 are largely due to their aggregation within a larger region (though
these countries will still be affected to some extent due to trade effects).
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Table 3 GDP—percentage loss by scenario (median SLR by 2085 of scenario in brackets)
Region A1B (0.47m) RAHM (1.12m) High (1.75m)
China −0.10 −0.21 −0.30
Japan −0.21 −0.53 −0.75
Korea −0.22 −0.57 −0.74
Indonesia −0.08 −0.32 −0.55
Russia −0.03 −0.04 −0.06
India −0.04 −0.09 −0.13
USA −0.08 −0.17 −0.27
Canada −0.08 −0.17 −0.24
Mexico 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
Brazil −0.02 −0.07 −0.13
South Africa 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
UK & Ireland −0.15 −0.35 −0.49
Northern Europe −0.18 −0.61 −1.00
Central Europe (North) −0.61 −1.07 −1.72
Central Europe (South) −0.12 −0.28 −0.37
Southern Europe −0.10 −0.21 −0.34
Australasia −0.03 −0.09 −0.13
Rest of South Asia −0.09 −0.28 −0.52
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa −0.01 −0.03 −0.05
Rest of Europe −0.09 −0.14 −0.19
Rest of South-east Asia −0.37 −1.12 −1.57
Rest of Former USSR 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
Middle East & North Africa −0.04 −0.10 −0.16
Central America & Caribbean −0.01 −0.03 −0.05
Rest of South America −0.10 −0.28 −0.48
World −0.15 −0.33 −0.50
case a 30% share is assumed (the rest of the damage affecting current expenditures), the two
variants consider lower and higher shares (15 and 45%). The results for the High scenario
are shown, as the consequences of changing the shares for the A1B and Rahm scenarios are
similar.
For all regions, the lower share of damage to capital lowers the GDP loss, and the higher
share raises the GDP loss, as expected. The one exception is the Rest of the Former USSR,
for which the absolute numbers are very small, especially in the higher share case. The
largest percentage changes are for Japan and the USA, which both fall by 49% in the lower
share scenario. The unweighted average of the percentage falls is −40% in the lower share
scenario, and+40% in the higher share scenario. The largest percentage point changes are for
Central Europe (North) (−0.79pp;+0.80pp) followed byRest of South-East Asia (−0.63pp;
+0.64pp).
The percentage changes in equivalent variation are smaller than those found for GDP.
This is expected as both capital and current consumption damages have a major impact
on equivalent variation, whereas capital damage has a much larger impact on GDP. Indeed
whether capital or current damage has a larger impact depends on the characteristics of the
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Table 4 Equivalent variation—percentage loss by scenario (median SLR by 2085 of scenario in brackets)
Region A1B (0.47m) RAHM (1.12m) High (1.75m)
China −2.18 −4.14 −5.63
Japan −0.56 −1.70 −2.16
Korea −1.28 −3.96 −4.22
Indonesia −0.54 −2.20 −3.44
Russia −0.17 −0.21 −0.23
India −0.77 −1.52 −2.22
USA −0.18 −0.58 −0.79
Canada −0.26 −0.74 −0.78
Mexico −0.03 −0.14 −0.21
Brazil −0.08 −0.40 −0.66
South Africa −0.03 −0.08 −0.12
UK & Ireland −0.37 −1.29 −1.58
Northern Europe −0.57 −2.56 −3.68
Central Europe (North) −1.38 −2.71 −4.24
Central Europe (South) −0.33 −0.96 −1.04
Southern Europe −0.23 −0.61 −0.88
Australasia −0.13 −0.54 −0.66
Rest of South Asia −0.98 −3.00 −5.20
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa −0.15 −0.33 −0.54
Rest of Europe −0.34 −0.48 −0.59
Rest of South-east Asia −3.30 −10.42 −12.91
Rest of Former USSR −0.11 −0.25 −0.37
Middle East & North Africa −0.30 −0.66 −0.96
Central America & Caribbean −0.07 −0.19 −0.33
Rest of South America −0.46 −1.31 −2.14
World −0.54 −1.40 −1.91
Fig. 1 Equivalent variation—percentage loss in High scenario (1.75m rise in median SLR by 2085)
region, which is why some regions show a higher welfare loss for a lower capital damage
share (and a lower loss for a higher share) and other regions show the opposite. For the
lower share scenario, the largest percentage increase in damage is for Russia (36%) and the
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Table 5 GDP—percentage loss by share of damage to capital (High scenario only)







China −0.26 −0.30 −0.34
Japan −0.39 −0.75 −1.12
Korea −0.39 −0.74 −1.09
Indonesia −0.31 −0.55 −0.78
Russia −0.04 −0.06 −0.08
India −0.09 −0.13 −0.17
USA −0.14 −0.27 −0.40
Canada −0.13 −0.24 −0.35
Mexico −0.01 −0.01 −0.02
Brazil −0.08 −0.13 −0.19
South Africa −0.01 −0.02 −0.03
UK & Ireland −0.30 −0.49 −0.69
Northern Europe −0.58 −1.00 −1.43
Central Europe (North) −0.93 −1.72 −2.52
Central Europe (South) −0.21 −0.37 −0.54
Southern Europe −0.18 −0.34 −0.50
Australasia −0.08 −0.13 −0.19
Rest of South Asia −0.29 −0.52 −0.75
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa −0.03 −0.05 −0.06
Rest of Europe −0.10 −0.19 −0.28
Rest of South-east Asia −0.94 −1.57 −2.21
Rest of Former USSR −0.01 −0.01 0.00
Middle East & North Africa −0.09 −0.16 −0.24
Central America & Caribbean −0.03 −0.05 −0.07
Rest of South America −0.28 −0.48 −0.68
World −0.28 −0.50 −0.72
largest percentage fall is for Central Europe (North) (31%). The largest percentage point
increase is for China (0.77pp) and the largest percentage point fall is for Central Europe
(North) (1.31pp). The unweighted average of the absolute percentage differences is 16% for
the lower share scenario.
One notes a tendency for higher damage estimates for relatively rich regions when the
assumed capital intensity is higher (as is the case for Japan,Korea,USA,Canada, all European
regions and Australasia); whereas the opposite is often, though not always, true for relatively
poor regions. This is partially driven by the differences in the economies’ capital-to-labour
ratios.
We conclude from this sensitivity analysis that the choice of the share of damages going
to capital can influence the size of regional results significantly, and for equivalent variation
can do so in different directions. More systematic research is needed also regarding other
parameters and structural features of themodels. Nevertheless, even under the large parameter
changes entered here for the sensitivity analysis, the overall picture is maintained: the same
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Table 6 Equivalent variation—percentage loss by share of damage to capital (High scenario only)







China −6.41 −5.63 −4.86
Japan −1.54 −2.16 −2.78
Korea −4.03 −4.22 −4.42
Indonesia −3.49 −3.44 −3.39
Russia −0.31 −0.23 −0.15
India −2.52 −2.22 −1.93
USA −0.61 −0.79 −0.97
Canada −0.64 −0.78 −0.93
Mexico −0.23 −0.21 −0.19
Brazil −0.62 −0.66 −0.69
South Africa −0.10 −0.12 −0.15
UK & Ireland −1.31 −1.58 −1.85
Northern Europe −2.96 −3.68 −4.41
Central Europe (North) −2.93 −4.24 −5.58
Central Europe (South) −0.76 −1.04 −1.32
Southern Europe −0.62 −0.88 −1.15
Australasia −0.59 −0.66 −0.72
Rest of South Asia −5.66 −5.20 −4.74
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa −0.65 −0.54 −0.43
Rest of Europe −0.46 −0.59 −0.73
Rest of South-east Asia −13.58 −12.91 −12.25
Rest of Former USSR −0.47 −0.37 −0.27
Middle East & North Africa −0.96 −0.96 −0.95
Central America & Caribbean −0.33 −0.33 −0.33
Rest of South America −2.05 −2.14 −2.24
World −1.67 −1.91 −2.14
regions are the most affected and the broad magnitude of the impact remains, especially in
terms of welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses the DIVA model estimates of direct impacts of sea-level rise and the CAGE
world CGE model to estimate the economy-wide implications of various SLR scenarios in
the absence of public adaptation. There are two new elements of the analysis compared to the
literature. First, the study considers a wider range of SLR (including extreme SLR). The SLR
impacts under the A1B scenario (with 0.47m SLR by the 2080s, relative to pre-industrial
levels) are compared to other scenarios that consider the influence of major ice sheet melting,
which yield a 1.12 and 1.75m SLR by the 2080s.
A second novel aspect of this research is that it models a range of types of damage
shocks, which has not been previously considered in a global assessment. In particular, some
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previous assessments have only modelled the SLR economic impacts due to land loss, which
is indeed a small share of the overall direct economic damage. Other damage categories,
such as migration costs and sea floods costs, are much more significant, and their influence
on economic activity and welfare have been explicitly considered in this article. Sea floods
costs and other costs are decomposed into two main damage categories in the CGE model:
current consumption losses and capital losses.
By incorporating 25 world regions in the assessment, there is also more detail of the
regional differences than previous world-wide studies. The simulation results of this article
can be potentially used to underpin the regional damages estimates of stylised regional
integrated assessment models (e.g. Hof et al. 2013).
Regarding the results of the analysis, it is particularly notable that the regions that are
heavily impacted in terms of GDP, which is driven by the percentage cumulative loss of
capital, are not always the same as those heavily impacted in terms of welfare (equivalent
variation), which is driven by current consumption costs and forced migration.
The impact estimates are relatively large compared with those of previous studies, even
for the case of lower SLR. For example, Bosello et al. (2012) find damages for non-EU
countries of around 0.03% of GDP for a sea-level rise similar to the A1B scenario here
without adaptation, whereas we find approximately 0.15% of GDP: five times as large. This
is mainly due to the fact that a broader definition of impacts is considered in the analysis with
the inclusion of migration costs and sea floods costs. There is also a large regional variation in
economic damages. For instance, regarding welfare losses, while the global loss is estimated
to be 1.4% for the 1.12mSLR case, it can reachmore than 10% in the Rest of South-east Asia
and 4% in China. Thus aggregate impact estimates mask considerable regional variability.
The regional pattern can be useful for designing regional public adaptation policies.
A number of caveats should be raised. First, the results of this preliminary assessment
should not be interpreted as a projection or forecast of the likely impact of SLR. This article
illustrates the application of onemethodology integrating direct cost estimates from a specific
coastal impact model (DIVA) into a particular economic model (CAGE). While we hope it is
informative, there aremany uncertainties in themodelling exercise that should be considered.
They range from the uncertainty about the extent of future global SLR and its regional pattern
to the many uncertainties in the biophysical and economic models. The model uncertainties
regard both their structural features as outlined in the mathematical equations and to their
parameterisation. Future research should conduct further sensitivity analyses on these sources
of uncertainties. Moreover, when considering the nature and level of impacts, results from
local and regional case studies should also be taken into account.
Appendix: Model Description andMathematical Model Statement of the CAGEModel
Model Description
This Appendix outlines the behaviour and interaction of the economic agents in the CAGE
model, followed by the mathematical model statement.
Producers seek to maximise profits subject to their production technology and the cost of
inputs. The production technology is modelled using a nested constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) function which is summarised in Fig. 2 below.
As shown, output is produced by combining capital (K) and labour (L) with energy (E)
and other intermediate inputs. All combinations of inputs are treated as imperfect substitutes,
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Fig. 2 Production structure in the CAGEmodel.Note: K–L–E refers to the capital–labour–energy bundle and
K–L to the capital–labour bundle
as governed by CES functions (though some are given low elasticity values to reflect low
levels of substitutability).
All commodities enter the marketplace. Production from each country can be sold either
within that country or exported. Similarly, the purchase of goods and services can be either
of domestic production or imports. Total domestic demand consists of that from households,
government, investment, intermediate inputs, and inputs for transport margins used for trade.
The extent to which this domestic demand is satisfied by imports or domestic production is
governed by a two-level constant elasticity of substitution function reflecting the imperfect
substitutability at both levels. On the lower level, imports from different regions are com-
bined, and on the upper level, the composite import commodity is combined with domestic
production (the Armington function, Armington 1969).
The economic institutions included in the model are households, government, firms and
the rest of the world. Households purchase marketed commodities at market prices, meaning
that the prices include commodity taxes. Households maximise their utility or well-being
based on their preferences and the relative prices of goods and services, subject to their
income constraints. Household consumption also has a nested structure, with households
first choosing between energy and non-energy commodities and then on consumption within
these categories. Substitutability within each nest is determined by a constant elasticity of
substitution function.14
There are general constraints to the system (which are not directly considered by any of
the particular economic agents). The zero profit constraint in production is imposed as firms
are assumed to operate in a competitive environment. There are also zero profit constraints
on domestic economic institutions—households, governments and investment—which mean
that all income to institutions must be accounted for with either spending or saving. With
respect to imports and transport margins, the zero profit conditions imply that their prices
are also constrained to match their costs, inclusive of margins and taxes, as appropriate.
The macroeconomic closure rules govern the savings-investment behaviour, aggregate
government finances, the behaviour of factor markets and the trade balance between each
country and the rest of theworld. The savings-investment closuremaintains a constant volume
of investment, and any change in the price of investment goods is adjusted for by changing the
14 The structure of household consumption and the elasticity values are chosen with reference to the MIT
EPPA model (Paltsev et al. 2005).
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value of household savings. The government closure allows public consumption to be flexible
in terms of quantity, then any additional revenue to government raises government income,
and hence raises government expenditure. In that case, government consumption is modelled
with a Leontief function, i.e. an increase (fall) in government expenditure proportionally
increases (decreases) consumption of all commodities. The factor-market closure fixes the
aggregate volume of both capital and labour at the regional level. Both capital and labour
can move between sectors, however capital and labour are immobile across regions. Thus,
returns to capital and wage rate of labour adjust to clear the market, and the wage and capital
prices are region specific. The rest-of-the-world closure fixes the current account balance
between regions at the benchmark level, with prices adjusting to ensure that all production







* Benchmark parameters, consumption related
c0(r) benchmark total consumption
cd0(i,r) benchmark household demand
ch0(i,r) benchmark minimum consumption
pc0(i,r) benchmark consumption price
tc(i,r) final consumption tax
tc_vat(i,r) vat tax rate final consumption
tc_oth(i,r) other taxes rate final consumption
ks0(r) benchmark capital supply




* Benchmark parameters, public consumption related
g0(r) benchmark total govt consumption
gd0(i,r) benchmark government demand
pg0(i,r) benchmark government price
tg(i,r) public consumption tax
* Benchmark parameters, investment related
inv0(r) benchmark total investment
invd0(i,r) benchmark investment demand
pinv0(i,r) benchmark investment input price
tinv(i,r) investment input tax
* Benchmark parameters, production related
y0(i,r) benchmark total output
d0(i,r) benchmark output to dom market
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e0(i,r) benchmark output to exports
id0(i,j,r) benchmark intermediate input
kd0(i,r) benchmark capital demand
ld0(l,i,r) benchmark labour demand
pi0(i,j,r) benchmark intermediate input price
pk0(i,r) benchmark capital input price
pl0(l,i,r) benchmark labour input price
ti(i,j,r) intermediate input tax
tk(i,r) capital use tax
tl(l,i,r) labour use tax
to(i,r) output tax
tk0(i,r) benchmark capital use tax
tl0(l,i,r) benchmark labour use tax
to0(i,r) benchmark output tax
tpk(i,r) capital technological progress
tpl(l,i,r) labour technological progress
tpm(i,j,r) material technological progress
* Benchmark parameters, trade related
a0(i,r) benchmark Armington supply
m0(i,r) benchmark imports
d0(i,r) benchmark domestic supply
md0(i,r,s) benchmark bilateral import demand
mad0(i,j,r,s) benchmark bilat. tr. margin demand
pmd0(i,r,s) benchmark bilateral import price
pma0(i,r,s) benchmark bilat. tr. margin price
tm(i,r,s) import tax
te(i,r,s) export tax
ma0(i) benchmark transport margin supply
mae0(i,r) bnchmrk exports to transport margin pool




c0_Y(i,r) benchmark unit cost sector i
c0_Ys(i,r) benchmark cost top-level sector i
c0_KLE(i,r) benchmark cost capital-labour-energy nest sector i
c0_KL(i,r) benchmark cost capital-labour cost sector i
c0_L(i,r) benchmark cost labour cost sector i
c0_ENG(i,r) benchmark cost energy nest sector i
c0_ENE(i,r) benchmark cost primary energy nest sector i
c0_ELE(i,r) benchmark cost electricity nest
c0_MAT(i,r) benchmark cost material nest sector i
* Substitution elasticities
sigma_MAT_KLE(i,r) substitution elasticity production: top-level (material vs value-
added-energy bundels)
sigma_MAT(i,r) substitution elasticity production: matrial bundel
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sigma_KLE(i,r) substitution elasticity production: energy vs value-added bundle
sigma_KL(i,r) substitution elasticity production: capital vs labor
sigma_ENG(i,r) substitution elasticity production: electricity vs primary energy prod-
ucts
sigma_L(i,r) substitution elasticity production: types of labor
sigma_ENE(i,r) substitution elasticity production: primary energy products
sigma_ELE(i,r) substitution elasticity production: electricity nest
* Armington trade
sigma_A(i,r) substitution elasticity Armington: domestic vs import bundle
sigma_M(i,r) substitution elasticity Armington: imported products
* Consumption
sigma_C(r) substitution elasticity consumption: top-level
sigma_CENE(r) substitution elasticity consumption: energy nest
sigma_COTH(r) substitution elasticity consumption: other i.e. non-energy
* Government and Investment
sigma_G(r) substitution elasticity government: top-level
sigma_I(r) substitution elasticity investment: top-level
* Value shares
thetaKL_L(i,r) labour share in capital-labour nest of branch i
thetaKL_K(i,r) capital share in capital-labour nest of branch i
thetaL(l,i,r) labour share by type in labour nest of branch i
thetaMAT(j,i,r) value share of commodity j in sector i material nest
thetaENE(j,i,r) primary energy shares commodity j in primary energy nest sector i
thetaELE(j,i,r) primary energy shares commodity j in energy-electricity nest sector i
thetaENG(i,r) share of electricity nest in ENG bundle
thetaKLE(i,r) share of KL nest in KLE bundle
thetaYs(i,r) share of KLE bundle in top level
* consumption
thetaC(r) share of energy commodity nest in total private consumption
thetaCENE(i,r) share of commodity i in energy commodity nest private consumption
thetaCOTH(i,r) share of commodity i in non-energy commodity nest private consumption
* Government and Investment
thetaG(i,r) share of commodity i in government consumption
thetaI(i,r) share of commodity i in investment consumption
* trade
thetaM(i,r,s) share commodity i produced in r in imports region s
thetaD(i,r) share domestic produced commodity i in Armington aggregate
thetaT(i,r) share of country r in transport pool commodity i
thetaMT(i,j,r,s) share of margin commodity i in import of good j from r to s
thetaMM(i,r,s) share of commodity value in imports of commodity i from r to s
Variables
* Activity variables (defined as indexes) Y(i,r) Production index
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C(r) Consumption expenditure index
GEXP(r) Government expenditure index
M(i,r) Import Index
A(i,r) Armington Index




PC(r) Consumption price index
PG(r) Government price Index
PM(i,r) Import price
PA(i,r) Armington price





INC_RA(r) Income representative agent
INC_G(r) Income government agent
* Auxiliary variables
LSMULT(r) Multiplier for equal yield (lumps sum tax recycling)
* Variables related to nesting structure, cost indexes
CMV(i,r) Variable for imported commodities
CM_LV(i,r,s) Variable for lower nest of import equation
CYV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: top level KLE vs MAT
CY_KLEV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: second level Capital–Labor–Energy Bundle
CY_MATV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: second level Material bundle
CY_KLV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: third level Capital–Labor Bundle
CY_ENGV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: third level Primary Energy–Electricity Bundle
CY_ENEV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: fourth level Primary Energy Bundle
CY_ELEV(i,r) Variable for prod fn: fourth level Electricity Bundle
C_EXPV(r) Variable for private consumption CES expre fn: energy—other bundle
C_CENEV(r) Variable for private consumption CES expre fn: energy bundle
C_COTHV(r) Variable for private consumption CES expre fn: non-energy bundle
DEMCV(i,r) Variable for private demand function
DEMY_YV(j,i,r) Variable for intermediate input demand function
DEMY_LV(i,r) Variable for labour demand function
DEMY_KV(i,r) Variable for capital demand function
DEMM_MV(i,s,r) Variable for demand for imports from s to r
DEMM_TV(j,i,s,r) Variable for demand for margins for imports from s to r
CAV(i,r) Variable for Armington aggtn CES
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Equations
Zero Profit Conditions
Zero profits in production
(
1 − toi,r
) × PYi,r = CYVi,r
Zero profits in consumption
PC,r = C_EXPVr





thetaGm_i,r × (1 + tgm_i,,r ) × PAm_i,r
pg0m_i,r
)





theta Im_i,r × (1 + tinvm_i,,r ) × PAm_i,r
pinv0m_i,r
)
Zero profits in imports
PMi,r = CMVi,r
Zero profits in Armington aggregation
PAi,r = CAVi,r

















Lower nest of imports (Leontief aggregation of commodities & international transport mar-
gin)






thetaMTm_ j,i,r,s × (1 + tmi,r,s) × PTm_ j
pma0i,r,s
)
Demand for imports from region s to region r
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Demand for margins on imports from region s to region r







thetaDi,r × PYi,r 1−sigma_Ai,r
+ (1 − thetaDi,r ) × PMi,r 1−sigma_Ai,r
)1/1−sigma_Ai,r
Private Consumption
Expenditure function—top level (energy vs other expenditure)
C_EXPVr =
(
thetaCr × C_CENEVr 1−sigma_Cr
+ (1 − thetaCr ) × C_COTHVr 1−sigma_Cr
)1/1−sigma_Cr










(1 + tcm_i,r ) × PAm_i,r
pc0m_i,r
)1−sigma_CENEr ))1/1−sigma_CENEr










(1 + tcm_i,r ) × PAm_i,r
pc0m_i,r
)1−sigma_COTHr ))1/1−sigma_COTHr
Private demand function A (for i = energy commodities)









(1 + tci,r ) × PAi,r
)sigma_CENEr
]
Private demand function B (for i = non-energy commodities)
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Production
Production cost function—top level (capital/labour/energy bundle—materials)
CYVi,r = c0_Yi,r ×
(
thetaY si,r × CY_KLEV1−sigma_MAT_KLEi,ri,r
+ (1 − thetaY si,r ) × CY_MATV1−sigma_MAT_KLEi,r
)1/1−sigma_MAT_KLEi,r




+ (1 − thetaKLEi,r ) × CY_ENGV1−sigma_KLEi,ri,r
)1/1−sigma_KLEi,r


















(1 + tki,r ) × PKr
pk0i,r
)1−sigma_K Li,r
+ thetaK L_Li,r ×
(
(1 + tli,r ) × PLr
pl0i,r
)1−sigma_K Li,r )1/1−sigma_KLEi,r




+ (1 − thetaENGi,r ) × CY_ENEV 1−sigma_ENGi,ri,r
)1/1−sigma_ENGi,r
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Intermediate demand function A (for j = electricity)

















CY_ELEVi,r × pi0 j,i,r
(1 + ti j,i,r ) × PA j,r
)sigma_ELEi,r
}
Intermediate demand function B (for j = non-electricity energy)

















CY_ELEVi,r × pi0 j,i,r
(1 + ti j,i,r ) × PA j,r
)sigma_ENEi,r
}
Intermediate demand function C (for j = non-energy materials)







CY_MATVi,r × pi0 j,i,r
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Market clearing Armington
a0i,r × Ai,r =
∑
j
DEMY_YVi, j,r + DEMCVi,r + chi,r + gd0i,r × GEXPr
+ invd0i,r × INVr
Market clearing imports





Market clearing transport services














Market clearing government consumption
g0i,r × GEXPr × PGr = INC_Gr
Market clearing private consumption
c0r × Cr × PCr = INC_RAr
Market clearing investment
inv0r × INVr = inv0r
Income Definitions
Income of the representative agent15




(1 + tci,r ) × PAi,r × chi,r
)
− inv0r × PINVr − htax0r × PCr
15 This closure assumes constant transfer payments from government to household. An alternative closure
exists that can be used for revenue recycling.
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Government income16 (output tax+ factor tax+ intermediate input tax+ final consumption























tci,r × PAi,r × (DEMCVi,r + chi,r ) + tgi,r × PAi,r × g0i,r






















Constant government budget constraint (only active if using the revenue recycling closure)
GEXPr = 1
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